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.ANTrrn.usT LAws-CoNCERTED REFusALS To DEAL-PUBLIC INJURYPetitioner, Klor's, Inc., a retail electrical appliance store, brought a treble
damage action against Broadway-Hale, a department store chain, and
against ten appliance manufacturers, alleging conspiracy to restrain and
monopolize commerce in violation of sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act.
The complaint charged essentially that Broadway-Hale, which operated a
store next door to Klor's, had been able by virtue of ii:s great buying power
to induce a concerted refusal to deal on the part of major appliance manufacturers, so that they would sell to Klor's only on highly unfavorable
terms if at all. Respondents submitted affidavits which showed that hundreds of appliance dealers flourished in the area in which Klor's was located, dealing in the branded merchandise which Klor's could not obtain
from respondent manufacturers. The district court granted respondents'
motion for summary judgment, holding that no public injury was present,
and describing the controversy as a "purely private quarrel." The· Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. On certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, held, reversed and remanded for trial.1 Since group boycotts are within that class of restraints which from the~r very nature and
character are unduly restrictive, Congress has determined its own criteria
of public injury as to them. Thus petitioner has stated a cause of action.
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
Although Supreme Court dictum has often characterized concerted refusals to deal as unreasonable per se,2 the fact that cases relied upon to
support that view have involved improper purposes or effects3 which would
lead to condemnation under a rule of reason approach had left open the
possibility that such an approach was not precluded in group boycott
cases.4 The principal case, with its broad malediction of concerted refusals

1 Justice Harlan concurred on the ground that respondents' affidavits did not neces•
sarily constitute a defense irrespective of what petitioner may be able to prove at the trial.
2 See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 at 522 (1948); Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 at 625 (1953).
8 See, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram &: Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951)
(price fixing); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Assn. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600
(1914) (elimination of competition); Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312
U.S. 457 (1941) (elimination of competition).
4 United States v. Insurance Board of Cleveland, (N.D. Ohio 1956) 144 F. Supp. 684
at 698: "In none of the cited cases was the decision of the Supreme Court based upon
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to deal, would seem to put to rest all doubts concerning the classification
of group boycotts as per se violations of the antitrust laws.15 The Court
makes no reference to limitations which would except self-restricting, noncoercive refusals to deal (e.g., reasonable rules among members of trading
boards or exchanges) from the operation of the per se rule, a possible indication that such suggested limitations6 will not be applied. Justifications
for group refusals to deal such as prevention of illegal relationships, 7 credit
regulation,8 and elimination of trade abuses9 may not be totally without
force, but their applicability in the unreasonable per se setting will have
to be tested in future cases. Since a violation of the Sherman Act necessarily is injurious to the public,10 classification of group boycotts as unreasonable per se frees the plaintiff in a private action based upon such practices from the requirement of establishing that degree of public injury
which is an element of any antitrust violation.
On remand, Klor's will be presented with the evidentiary problem of
proving conspiracy on the part of the respondent manufacturers. Unless the
contemporaneous similar action of the manufacturers can circumstantially
create an inference of conspiracy beyond mere "conscious parallelism," 11

the application of the principle that all boycotts are illegal per se. Having forebome
the declaration of such a principle in cases where group refusals to deal were directly
in issue, it is unreasonable to suppose that the court intended to announce such a
principle in cases where the issue was not presented." Note, 55 MICH. L. REv. 1035 (1957).
Accord, United States v. New Orleans Ins. Exchange, (E.D. La. 1957) 148 F. Supp. 915,
affd. per curiam 355 U.S. 22 (1957).
5 The Court distinguished individual refusals to deal and exclusive distributorship
contracts from the agreement alleged in the principal case. Cf. United States v. Colgate
&: Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
6 See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAws (1955): " ••. group action coercing outside parties is deemed an undue
restraint of trade, and whatever its purpose, is likely to fall as unreasonable per se."
(Italics added.) See also comment, 51 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 628 (1956).
7 See United States v. American Livestock Cominission Co., 279 U.S. 435 (1929).
s See Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). See also, note, 41 CoL. L.
REv. 941 (1941). Cf. Ruddy Brook Clothes, Inc. v. British &: Foreign Marine Ins. Co.,
(7th Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 86, cert. den. 344 U.S. 816 (1952).
9 See Butterick Pub. Co. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1936) 85 F. (2d) 522 at 527. See, generally,
LAMB AND KrI"rELLE, TRADE AssOCIATION LAW AND PRACTICE c. 10 (1956).
10 "Congress has, by legislative fiat, deterinined that such prohibited activities are
injurious to the public and has provided sanctions allowing private enforcement of the
antitrust laws by an aggrieved party. These laws protect the victiins of forbidden practices as well as the public.••. In the face of such a policy this Court should not add
requirements to burden the private litigant beyond what is specifically set forth by Congress in those laws." Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 at 453-454 (1957).
11 "It is elementary that an unlawful conspiracy may be and often is formed without
simultaneous action or agreement on the part of the conspirators. . . • Acceptance by
competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan, the
necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is
sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act." Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939). See note, 64 YALE L.J. 581 (1955).
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the problem of proving an agreement is likely to be a· difficult one. While
uniform behavior is certainly relevant evidence of agreement, it is now
clear that more is necessary to establish conspiracy under the antitrust
laws.12 If Klor's is unable to prove conspiracy, it would seetn at first glance
that its only remedy against Broadway-Hale would be in a tort action for
interference with business relationships.13 However, it is at least arguable
that Broadway-Hale had a predatory purpose which was effectuated through
sales contracts entered into with the manufacturers on condition that appliances be withheld from Klor's. In that event, a "contract in restraint of
trade" would be present.14 It should be noted, however, that if Klor's is to
prevail under this theory, it will be necessary for it to show public injury.
Unlike the situation involving an unreasonable per se violation, where
public injury will be deemed to have been determined by Congress, proof
of a violation in the normal case must include the component of injury to
competition.15 Such injury might be found in the deterrent effect which
Klor's fate, if unredressed, will have upon other small dealers.1 6 The potentiality of such competitive restraint resulting from Broadway-Hale's action
is as great as would be that resulting from a conspiracy among the manufacturers, and it would seem anomalous to deny Klor's recovery in the event
that conspiracy could not be proved.
Jerome S. Traum, S.Ed.

12 Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537 at
541 (1954): " •.• 'conscious parallelism' ·has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman
Act entirely." Cf. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY
THE ANTITRUST l.Aws 36-42 (1955).
13 See, e.g., Delz v. Winfree, 80 Tex. 400, 16 S.W. 111 (1891), where plaintiff butcher
was held to have a cause of action against cattle dealers who boycotted him and induced
a third person to refuse to sell him supplies.
14 In FTC v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565 (1924), it was held that a wholesale dealer in groceries had the right unilaterally to refuse to buy from a grocery manufacturer unless the manufacturer ceased making direct sales to a competitor whose primary
business was operation of a retail chain. The principal case might be differentiated on
the ground that Raymond Bros.-Clark Co. was furthering a proper business interest
(preservation of customer classifications), whereas there was no apparent legitimate
business purpose being served by Broadway-Hale's course of action.
15 Cf. Radovich v. National Football League, note 10 supra.
16 See note, 68 YALE L.J. 949 at 956 (1959).

